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Boece - Boethius's The Consolation of Philosophy - Book 5
Incipit Liber Quintus

Prosa 1	Sche hadde seyd, and torned the cours of
	hir resoun to some othere thingis to ben treted
	and to ben ispedd. Thanne seide I, "Certes
	ryghtful is thin amonestynge and ful digne by
5	auctorite. But that thou seydest whilom that
	the questioun of the devyne purveaunce is enlaced
	with many othere questiouns, I undirstande
	wel and prove it by the same thing.
	But I axe yif that thou wenest that hap be
10	anything in any weys; and yif thou wenest
	that hap be anything, what is it?"
	Thanne quod sche, "I haste me to yelden
	and assoilen to the the dette of my byheste, and
	to schewen and openen the the
15	wey, by whiche wey thou maist comen ayein to thi contre. But
	al be it so that the thingis whiche that thou axest
	ben ryght profitable to knowe, yit ben thei
	divers somwhat fro the path of my purpos; and
	it is to douten that thou ne be makid weery
20	by mysweyes, so that thou ne maist nat
	suffise to mesuren the ryghte weie."
	"Ne doute the therof nothing," quod I; "for
	for to knowen thilke thingis togidre, in the
	whiche thinges I delite me gretly -- that schal
25	ben to me in stede of reste, syn it nis nat to
	douten of the thingis folwynge, whan every syde
	of thi disputesoun schal han ben stedfast to me
	by undoutous feyth."
	"Thanne," seide sche, "that manere wol
30	I don the," and bygan to speken ryght thus:
	"Certes," quod sche, "yif any wyght
	diffynisse hap in this manere, that is to seyn that
	`hap is bytydynge ibrought forth by foolisshe
	moevynge and by no knyttynge of causes,' I
35	conferme that hap nis ryght naught in no wise;
	and I deme al outrely that hap nis but an idel
	voys (as who seith, but an idel word), withouten
	any significacioun of thing summitted
	to that voys. For what place myght ben
40	left or duellynge to folie and to disordenaunce,
	syn that God ledeth and
	constreyneth alle thingis by ordre? For this
	sentence is verray and soth, that `no thing hath
	his beynge of naught,' to the whiche sentence
45	noon of thise oolde folk ne withseide nevere; al
	be it so that they ne undirstoden ne meneden it
	nat by God, prince and bygynnere of wirkynge,
	but thei casten as a maner foundement of subject
	material (that is to seyn, of the nature of
50	alle resouns). And yif that any thing is
	woxen or comen of no causes, thanne schal
	it seme that thilke thing is comen or woxen of
	nawght; but yif this ne mai nat ben don, thanne
	is it nat possible that hap be any swich thing as
55	I have diffynysschid a litil herebyforn."
	"How schal it thanne be?" quod I. "Nys ther
	thanne nothing that by right may ben clepid
	other hap or elles aventure of fortune; or is ther
	awght, al be it so that it is hidd fro the
60	peple, to whiche thing thise wordes ben
	covenable?"
	"Myn Aristotle," quod sche, "in the book of
	his Phisic diffynysseth this thing by schort
	resoun, and nyghe to the sothe."
65	"In whiche manere?" quod I.
	"As ofte, quod sche, "as men don any thing
	for grace of any other thing, and another thing
	than thilke thing that men entenden to don
	bytideth by some causes, it is clepid hap.
70	Ryght as a man dalf the erthe bycause of
	tylyinge of the feld, and founde ther a
	gobet of gold bydolven; thanne wenen folk
	that it is byfalle by fortunous bytydynge. But
	forsothe it nis nat of naught, for it hath his
75	propre causes, of whiche causes the cours unforseyn
	and unwar semeth to han makid hap.
	For yif the tiliere of the feeld ne dulve nat in the
	erthe, and yif the hidere of the gold ne hadde
	hyd the gold in thilke place, the gold ne
80	hadde nat ben founde. Thise ben thanne
	the causes of the abregginge of fortuit hap,
	the whiche abreggynge of fortuit hap cometh of
	causes encontrynge and flowynge togidere to
	hemself, and nat by the entencioun of the doere.
85	For neither the hidere of the gold ne the delvere
	of the feeld ne undirstoden nat that the gold
	sholde han ben founde; but, as I seide, it bytidde
	and ran togidre that he dalf thare as that oothir
	had hid the gold. Now mai I thus diffinysshen
90	hap: hap is an unwar betydinge
	of causes assembled in thingis that ben
	doon for som oothir thing; but thilke ordre,
	procedinge by an uneschuable byndinge togidre,
	whiche that descendeth fro the welle of
95	purveaunce that ordeyneth alle thingis in hir
	places and in hir tymes, makith that the causes
	rennen and assemblen togidre.
Metrum 1	"Tigrys and Eufrates resolven and springen
	of o welle in the cragges of the roche of the
	contre of Achemenye, ther as the fleinge bataile
	ficcheth hir dartes retorned in the breestis
5	of hem that folwen hem. And sone aftir the
	same ryverys, Tigris and Eufrates, unjoignen
	and departen hir watres. And if thei comen togidre
	and ben assemblid and clepid togidre
	into o cours, thanne moten thilke thingis
10	fleten togidre whiche that the watir of
	the entrechaungynge flood bryngeth. The
	schippes and the stokkes araced with the flood
	moten assemblen; and the watris imedled
	wrappeth or emplieth many fortunel happes
15	or maneris; the whiche wandrynge happes
	natheles thilke enclynynge lowenesse of the
	erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge
	watir governeth. Right so fortune, that semeth
	as it fletith with slakid or ungoverned
20	bridles, it suffreth bridelis (that is to seyn,
	to ben governed), and passeth by thilke
	lawe (that is to seyn, by the devyne ordenaunce)."
Prosa 2	"This undirstonde I wel," quod I, "and I accorde
	me that it is ryght as thou seist. But I
	axe yif ther be any liberte of fre wille in this
	ordre of causes that clyven thus togidre in
5	hemself, or elles I wolde witen yif that the
	destinal cheyne constrenith the moevynges of
	the corages of men."
	"Yis," quod sche, "ther is liberte of fre wil,
	ne ther ne was nevere no nature of resoun
10	that it ne hadde liberte of fre wil. For every
	thing that may naturely usen resoun,
	it hath doom by whiche it discernith and demeth
	every thing; thanne knoweth it by itself
	thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben
15	to desiren. And thilke thing that any wight
	demeth to ben desired, that axeth or desireth
	he; and fleeth thilke thing that he troweth be
	to fleen. Wherfore in alle thingis that resoun
	is, in hem also is liberte of willynge and of
20	nillynge. But I ne ordeyne nat (as who
	seith, I ne graunte nat) that this liberte be
	evenelyk in alle thinges. Forwhy in the sovereynes
	devynes substaunces (that is to seyn,
	in spiritz) jugement is more cleer, and wil nat
25	icorrumped, and myght redy to speden thinges
	that ben desired. But the soules of men moten
	nedes be more fre whan thei loken hem in the
	speculacioun or lokynge of the devyne thought;
	and lasse fre whan thei slyden into the bodyes;
30	and yit lasse fre whan thei ben gadrid
	togidre and comprehended in erthli
	membres; but the laste servage is whan that
	thei ben yeven to vices and han ifalle fro the
	possessioun of hir propre resoun. For aftir that
35	thei han cast awey hir eyghen fro the lyght
	of the sovereyn sothfastnesse to lowe thingis
	and derke, anon thei derken by the cloude of
	ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talentz;
	to the whiche talentz whan thei approchen
40	and assenten, thei helpen and
	encrecen the servage whiche thei han
	joyned to hemself; and in this manere thei ben
	caytifs fro hir propre liberte. The whiche thingis
	natheles the lokynge of the devyne purveaunce
45	seth, that alle thingis byholdeth and seeth fro
	eterne, and ordeyneth hem everiche in here
	merites as thei ben predestinat; and it is seid in
	Greke that `alle thinges he seeth and alle thinges
	he herith.'
Metrum 2	"Homer with the hony mouth (that is to seyn,
	Homer with the swete ditees) singeth that the
	sonne is cler by pure light; natheles yit ne
	mai it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes,
5	breken or percen the inward entrayles of the
	erthe or elles of the see. So ne seth nat God,
	makere of the grete werld. To hym, that loketh
	alle thinges from an hey, ne withstondeth
	no thinges by hevynesse of erthe, ne the
10	nyght ne withstondeth nat to hym by the
	blake cloudes. Thilke God seeth in o strok
	of thought alle thinges that ben, or weren, or
	schollen comen; and thilke God, for he loketh
	and seeth alle thingis alone, thou maist seyn
15	that he is the verrai sonne."
Prosa 3	Thanne seide I, "Now am I confowndide by
	a more hard doute than I was."
	"What doute is that?" quod sche, "for certes I
	conjecte now by whiche thingis thou art trubled."
5	"It semeth," quod I, "to repugnen and to
	contrarien gretly, that God knoweth byforn alle
	thinges and that ther is any fredom of liberte.
	For yif so be that God loketh alle thinges
	byforn, ne God ne mai nat ben desceyved
10	in no manere, thanne moot it nedes ben that
	alle thinges betyden the whiche that the
	purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn to comen.
	For whiche, yif that God knoweth byforn nat
	oonly the werkes of men, but also hir conseilles
15	and hir willes, thanne ne schal ther be no liberte
	of arbitrie; ne certes ther ne may be noon
	othir dede, ne no wil, but thilke whiche that the
	devyne purveaunce, that ne mai nat ben disseyved,
	hath felid byforn. For yif that thei
20	myghten writhen awey in othere manere
	than thei ben purveyed, thanne ne sholde
	ther be no stedefast prescience of thing to
	comen, but rather an uncerteyn opynioun; the
	whiche thing to trowen of God, I deme it felonye
25	and unleveful.
	"Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun (as who
	seith, I ne allowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke
	same resoun) by whiche that som men wenen
	that thei mowe assoilen and unknytten the
30	knotte of this questioun. For certes thei
	seyn that thing nis nat to comen for that the
	purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn that it is to
	comen, but rathir the contrarie; and that is this:
	that, for that the thing is to comen, that therfore
35	ne mai it nat ben hidd fro the purveaunce of
	God; and in this manere this necessite slideth
	ayein into the contrarie partie: ne it ne byhoveth
	nat nedes that thinges betiden that ben
	ipurveied, but it byhoveth nedes that thinges
40	that ben to comen ben ipurveied -- but as
	it were Y travailed (as who seith, that
	thilke answere procedith ryght as though men
	travaileden or weren besy) to enqueren the
	whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing, as
45	whethir the prescience is cause of the necessite
	of thinges to comen, or elles that the necessite of
	thinges to comen is cause of the purveaunce. But
	I ne enforce me nat now to schewen it, that
	the bytidynge of thingis iwyst byforn is
50	necessarie, how so or in what manere that
	the ordre of causes hath itself; although
	that it ne seme naught that the prescience bringe
	in necessite of bytydinge to thinges to comen.
	"For certes yif that any wyght sitteth, it byhoveth
55	by necessite that the opynioun be soth of
	hym that conjecteth that he sitteth. and
	ayeinward also is it of the contrarie: yif the
	opinioun be soth of any wyght for that he sitteth,
	it byhoveth by necessite that he sitte.
60	Thanne is here necessite in the toon and in
	the tothir; for in the toon is necessite of
	syttynge, and certes in the tothir is necessite of
	soth. But therfore ne sitteth nat a wyght for that
	the opynioun of the sittynge is soth, but the
65	opinioun is rather soth for that a wyght sitteth
	byforn. And thus, althoughe that the cause of the
	soth cometh of that other side (as who seith,
	that althoughe the cause of soth cometh of the
	sittynge, and nat of the trewe opinioun),
70	algatis yit is ther comune necessite in that
	oon and in that othir. Thus scheweth it that
	Y may make semblable skiles of the purveaunce
	of God and of thingis to comen. For althoughe
	that for that thingis ben to comen therfore ben
75	thei purveied, and nat certes for thei be purveied
	therfore ne bytide thei nat; yit natheles byhoveth
	it by necessite that eyther the thinges to comen
	ben ipurveied of God, or elles that the thinges
	that ben ipurveyed of God betyden. And
80	this thing oonly suffiseth inow to destroien
	the fredom of oure arbitre (that is to seyn,
	of our fre wil).
	"But certes now schewith it wel how fer fro
	the sothe and how up-so-doun is this thing that
85	we seyn, that the betydynge of temporel thingis
	is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to
	wenen that God purveieth the thinges to comen
	for thei ben to comen -- what oothir thing is it
	but for to wene that thilke thinges that
90	bytidden whilom ben cause of thilke
	soverein purveaunce that is in God? And
	herto I adde yit this thing: that ryght as whanne
	that I woot that a thing is, it byhoveth by
	necessite that thilke selve thing be; and eek
95	whan I have knowen that any thing schal
	betyden; so byhovith it by necessite that thilke
	same thing betide; so folweth it thanne that the
	betydynge of the thing iwyste byforn ne may nat
	ben eschued. And at the laste, yif that any
100	wyght wene a thing to ben oothir weyes
	than it is, it nis nat oonly unscience, but it
	is desceyvable opynioun ful divers and fer fro
	the sothe of science. Wherfore, yif any thing be
	so to comen that the betidynge of it ne be nat
105	certein ne necessarie, who mai witen byforn that
	thilke thing is to comen? For ryght as science ne
	may nat ben medled with falsnesse (as who
	seith, that yif I woot a thing, it ne mai nat
	ben fals that I ne woot it), ryght so thilke
110	thing that is conceyved by science ne may
	nat ben noon other weies than as it is
	conceyved. For that is the cause why that science
	wanteth lesynge (as who seith, why that
	wytynge ne resceyveth nat lesynge of that it
115	woot); for it byhoveth by necessite that every
	thing be ryght as science comprehendeth it
	to be.
	"What schal I thanne seyn? In whiche manere
	knoweth God byforn the thinges to comen,
120	yif thei ne ben nat certein? For yif that he
	deme that thei ben to comen uneschewably,
	and so may be that it is possible that thei
	ne schollen nat comen, God is disseyved. But
	not oonly to trowe that God is disseyved, but for
125	to speke it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne.
	But yif that God woot that ryght so as thinges
	ben to comen, so schollen they comen, so that he
	wite egaly (as who seith, indifferently) that
	thingis mowen ben doon or elles nat
130	idoon, what is thilke prescience that ne
	comprehendeth no certein thing ne stable?
	Or elles what difference is ther bytwixe the
	prescience and thilke japeworthi devynynge of
	Tyresie the divynour, that seide, `Al that I seie,'
135	quod he, `either it schal be or elles it ne schal nat
	be?' Or elles how mochel is worth the devyne
	prescience more than the opinioun of mankynde,
	yif so be that it demeth the thinges
	uncertayn, as men doon, of the whiche
140	domes of men the betydinge nis nat
	certein? But yif so be that noon uncertein
	thing ne mai ben in hym that is right certeyn
	welle of alle thingis, than is the betydinge
	certein of thilke thingis whiche he hath wist
145	byforn fermely to comen. For whiche it folweth
	that the fredom of the conseiles and of the
	werkis of mankynde nis noon, syn that the
	thought of God, that seeth alle thinges withouten
	errour of falsnesse, byndeth and
150	constreyneth hem to o bytidynge by
	necessite.
	"And yif this thing be oonys igrauntid and
	resceyved (that is to seyn, that ther nis no fre
	wil), thanne scheweth it wel how gret destruccioun
155	and how gret damages ther folwen of
	thingis of mankynde. For in idel ben ther thanne
	purposed and byhyght medes to good folk, and
	peynes to badde folk, syn that no moevynge of
	fre corage and voluntarie ne hath nat
160	disservid hem (that is to seyn, neither
	mede ne peyne). And it scholde seme
	thanne that thilke thing is alther-worst whiche
	that is now demed for alther-moost just
	and moost ryghtful, that is to seyn that schrewes ben
165	punysschid or elles that good folk ben
	igerdoned, the whiche folk syn that hir propre
	wil ne sent hem nat to the toon ne to that othir
	(that is to seyn, neither to good ne to harm), but
	constreyneth hem certein necessite of
170	thingis to comen. Thanne ne schulle ther
	nevere be, ne nevere were, vice ne vertu,
	but it scholde rather ben confusion of alle
	dissertes medlid withouten discrecioun. And yit
	ther folweth anothir inconvenient, of the whiche
175	ther ne mai be thought no more felonous ne
	more wikke, and that is this: that, so as the ordre
	of thingis is iled and cometh of the purveaunce
	of God, ne that nothing is leveful to the
	conseiles of mankynde (as who seith that
180	men han no power to don nothing ne wilne
	nothing), thanne folweth it that oure vices
	ben referrid to the makere of alle good
	(as who seith, thanne folweth it that God
	oughte han the blame of our vices), syn he
185	constreyneth us by necessite to doon vices.
	"Than nis ther no resoun to han hope in God,
	ne for to preien to God. For what scholde any
	wyght hopen to God, or why scholde he preien
	to God, syn that the ordenance of destyne
190	whiche that mai nat ben enclyned knytteth
	and streyneth alle thingis that men mai
	desiren? Thanne scholde ther be don awey
	thilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen God and men
	(that is to seyn, to hopen and to preien). But
195	by the pris of ryghtwisnesse and of verray
	mekenesse we disserven the gerdon of the
	devyne grace whiche that is inestimable (that is
	to seyn, that it is so greet that it ne mai nat ben
	ful ipreysed). And this is oonly the manere
200	(that is to seyn, hope and preieris) for
	whiche it semeth that men mowen spekyn
	with God, and by resoun of supplicacion be
	conjoyned to thilke cleernesse that nis nat
	aprochid no rather or that men byseken it and
205	impetren it. And yif men ne wene nat that hope
	ne preieris ne han no strengthis by the necessite
	of thingis to comen iresceyved, what thing
	is ther thanne by whiche we mowen ben
	conjoyned and clyven to thilke sovereyne
210	prince of thingis? For whiche it byhoveth
	by necessite that the lynage of mankynde,
	as thou songe a litil herebyforn, be departed and
	unjoyned from his welle, and failen of his
	bygynnynge (that is to seyn, God).
Metrum 3	"What discordable cause hath torent and unjoyned
	the byndynge or the alliaunce of thingis
	(that is to seyn, the conjunccions of God and
	of man)? Whiche god hath establisschid so
5	gret bataile bytwixen these two sothfast or
	verreie thinges (that is to seyn, bytwyxen the
	purveaunce of God and fre wil) that thei ben
	singuler and dyvided, ne that they ne wole
	nat ben medled ne couplid togidre? But
10	ther nis no discord to the verray thinges,
	but thei clyven alwey certein to hemself;
	but the thought of man, confownded and over-throwen
	by the derke membres of the body,
	ne mai nat be fyr of his derked lookynge (that
15	is to seyn, by the vigour of his insyghte while
	the soule is in the body) knowen the thynne
	sutile knyttynges of thinges. But wherfore
	eschaufeth it so by so gret love to fynden
	thilke notes of soth icovered? (That is to
20	seyn, wherfore eschaufeth the thought of
	man by so gret desir to knowen thilke notificaciouns
	that ben ihid undir the covertures of
	soth?) Woot it aught thilke thing that it angwisshous
	desireth to knowe? (As who seith,
25	nay; for no man ne travaileth for to witen
	thingis that he wot. And therfore the texte
	seith thus:) But who travaileth to wite thingis
	iknowe? And yif that he ne knoweth hem nat,
	what sekith thilke blynde thoght? What is
30	he that desireth any thyng of which he wot
	right naught? (As who seith, whoso desireth
	any thing, nedes somwhat he knoweth of it,
	or elles he ne coude nat desiren it.) Or who may
	folwen thinges that ne ben nat iwist? And
35	thoughe that he seke tho thingis, wher schal
	he fynde hem? What wyght that is al unkunnynge
	and ignoraunt may knowe the forme
	that is ifounde? But whanne the soule byholdeth
	and seeth the heye thought (that is to
40	seyn, God), thanne knoweth it togidre the
	somme and the singularites (that is to seyn,
	the principles and everyche by hymself)? But
	now, while the soule is hidd in the cloude and
	in the derknesse of the membres of the body,
45	it ne hath nat al foryeten itself, but it withholdeth
	the somme of thinges and lesith the
	singularites. Thanne who so that sekith sothnesse,
	he nis in neyther nother habite, for he
	not nat al, ne he ne hath nat al foryeten;
50	but yit hym remembreth the somme of
	thinges that he withholdeth, and axeth conseile,
	and retretith deepliche thinges iseyn byforne
	(that is to seyn, the grete somme in his
	mynde) so that he mowe adden the parties
55	that he hath foryeten to thilke that he hath
	withholden."
	Than seide sche, "This is," quod sche, "the
	olde questioun of the purveaunce of God. And
	Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the divynaciouns
Prosa 4	(that is to seyn, in his book that he wrot
5	of dyvynaciouns), he moevede gretly this questioun;
	and thou thiself hast ysought it mochel
	and outrely and longe. But yit ne hath it nat
	ben determined ne isped fermely and diligently
	of any of yow. And the cause of this dirknesse
10	and of this difficulte is, for that the
	moevynge of the resoun of mankynde ne
	may nat moeven to (that is to seyn, applien
	or joignen to) the simplicite of the devyne prescience;
	the whiche symplicite of the devyne
15	prescience, yif that men myghte thinken it
	in any manere (that is to seyn, that yif
	men myghten thinken and comprehenden the
	thinges as God seeth hem), thanne ne scholde
	ther duelle outrely no doute. The whiche
20	resoun and cause of difficulte I schal assaye
	at the laste to schewe and to speden, whan
	I have first ispendid and answerd to the resouns
	by whiche thou art ymoeved.
	"For I axe whi thou wenest that thilke resoun
25	of hem that assoilen this questioun ne be
	nat speedful inow ne sufficient; the whiche solucioun,
	or the whiche resoun, for that it demeth
	that the prescience nis nat cause of necessite
	to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it
30	nat that fredom of wil be distorbed or
	ylet be prescience. For ne drawestow nat
	argumentz fro elleswhere of the necessite of
	thingis to comen (as who seith, any oothir wey
	than thus) but that thilke thinges that the
35	prescience woot byforn ne mowen nat unbetyde
	(that is to seyn, that thei moten betide)?
	But thanne, yif that prescience ne putteth
	no necessite to thingis to comen, as thou thiself
	hast confessed it and byknowen a litel
40	herebyforn, what cause or what is it (as
	who seith, ther may no cause be) by
	whiche that the endes voluntarie of thinges
	myghten be constreyned to certein bytydynge?
	For by grace of posicioun, so that thou mowe the
45	betere undirstonde this that folweth, I pose that
	ther ne be no prescience. Thanne axe I," quod
	sche, "in as moche as aperteneth to that,
	scholden thanne thingis that comen of fre wil
	ben constreyned to bytiden by necessite?"
50	Boecius. "Nay," quod I.
	"Thanne ayeinward," quod sche, "I
	suppose that ther be prescience, but that it ne
	putteth no necessite to thingis; thanne trowe I
	that thilke selve fredom of wil schal duellen al
55	hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt
	seyn that, al be it so that prescience nis nat cause
	of the necessite of bytydynge to thingis to
	comen, algatis yit it is a signe that the thingis ben
	to bytyden by necessite. By this manere
60	thanne, althoughe the prescience ne hadde
	nevere iben, yit algate, or at the leste wey,
	it is certein thing that the endes and bytydinges
	of thingis to comen scholden ben necessarie. For
	every signe scheweth and signifieth oonly what
65	the thing is, but it ne makith nat the thing that
	it signifieth. For whiche it byhoveth first to
	schewen that nothing ne bytideth that it ne
	betideth by necessite, so that it mai apiere that
	the prescience is signe of this necessite; or
70	elles, yif ther nere no necessite, certes
	thilke prescience ne myghte nat ben signe
	of thing that nis nat. But certes, it is now certein
	that the proeve of this, isusteyned by stedfast
	resoun, ne schal nat ben lad ne proeved by
75	signes, ne by argumentz itaken fro withoute, but
	by causes covenable and necessarie.
	"But thou mayst seyn, `How may it be that the
	thingis ne betyden nat that ben ipurveied to
	comen? But certes, ryght as we troweden
80	that tho thingis whiche that the purveaunce
	woot byforn to comen, ne ben nat to
	bytiden!' But that ne scholde we nat demen; but
	rathir, althoughe that thei schal betyden, yit ne
	have thei no necessite of hir kynde to betyden.
85	And this maystow lyghtly aperceyven by this
	that I schal seyn. For we seen many thingis whan
	thei ben done byforn oure eyen, ryght as men
	seen the cartere worken in the tornynge and in
	atemprynge or adressynge of hise cartes or
90	chariottes, and by this manere (as who
	seith, maistow undirstonden) of alle othere
	werkmen. Is ther thanne any necessite (as who
	seith, in our lookynge) that constreynith or
	compelleth any of thilke thingis to ben don so?"
95	Boece. "Nay," quod I, "for in idel and in veyn
	were al the effect of craft, yif that alle thingis
	weren moeved by constreynynge (that is to seyn,
	by constreinynge of our eyen or of our sighte)."
	Philosophie. "The thingis thanne," quod
100	she, "that, whan men doon hem, ne han no
	necessite that men doon hem, eek tho same
	thingis, first or thei ben don, thei ben to comen
	withoute necessite. Forwhy ther ben some
	thingis to betyden, of whiche the eendes and the
105	bytydynges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle
	necessite. For certes I ne trowe nat that any man
	wolde seyn this: that tho thingis that men don
	now, that thei ne weren to bytiden first or thei
	weren idoon; and thilke same thinges,
110	althoughe that men hadden iwyst hem
	byforn, yit thei han fre bytydynges. For
	ryght as science of thingis present ne bryngith in
	no necessite to thingis that men doon, right so
	the prescience of thinges to comen ne bryngith
115	in no necessite to thinges to bytiden.
	"But thou maist seyn that of thilke same it is
	idouted, as whethir that of thilke thingis that ne
	han noon issues and bytidynges necessaries, yif
	therof mai ben any prescience. For certes
120	thei semen to discorden, for thou wenest
	that yif that thingis ben iseyn byfore, that
	necessite folwith hem; and yif necessite faileth
	hem, thei ne myghten nat ben wist byforn; and
	that nothing may be comprehended by science
125	but certein. And yif tho thinges that ne han no
	certein bytydingis ben ipurveied as certein, it
	scholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat sothfastnesse
	of science. And thou wenest that it be
	dyvers fro the holnesse of science that any
130	man scholde deme a thing to ben otherwyse
	than it is itself.
	"And the cause of this errour is that of alle the
	thingis that every wyght hath iknowe,
	thei wenen that tho thingis ben iknowe al only by the
135	strengthe and by the nature of the thinges that
	ben iwyst or iknowe. And it is al the contrarye;
	for al that evere is iknowe, it is rather
	comprehendid and knowen, nat aftir his
	strengthe and his nature, but aftir the
140	faculte (that is to seyn, the power and the
	nature) of hem that knowen. And, for
	that this schal mowen schewen by a schort
	ensaumple, the same rowndnesse of a body,
	otherweys the sighte of the eighe knoweth it,
145	and otherweys the touchynge. The lookynge, by
	castynge of his bemys, waiteth and seeth fro afer
	al the body togidre, withoute moevynge of
	itself; but the touchynge clyveth and conjoyneth
	to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute
150	the envyrounynge, and comprehendeth by
	parties the roundnesse. And the man
	hymself, ootherweys wit byholdeth hym, and
	ootherweys ymaginacioun, and otherweyes
	resoun, and ootherweies intelligence. For the
155	wit comprehendith withoute-forth the figure of
	the body of the man that is establisschid in the
	matere subgett; but the ymaginacioun comprehendith
	oonly the figure withoute the
	matere; resoun surmountith ymaginacioun
160	and comprehendith by an universel lokynge
	the comune spece that is in the
	singuler peces. But the eighe of intelligence is
	heyere, for it surmountith the envyrounynge of
	the universite, and loketh over that bi pure
165	subtilte of thought thilke same symple forme of
	man that is perdurablely in the devyne thought.
	In whiche this oughte gretly to ben considered,
	that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden
	thinges enbraseth and contienith the
170	lowere strengthe; but the lower strengthe
	ne ariseth nat in no manere to the heyere
	strengthe. For wit ne mai no thing comprehende
	out of matere ne the ymaginacioun ne loketh nat
	the universel speces, ne resoun ne taketh nat the
175	symple forme so as intelligence takith it; but
	intelligence, that lookith as aboven, whanne it
	hath comprehended the forme, it knowith and
	demyth alle the thinges that ben undir that
	foorme; but sche knoweth hem in thilke
180	manere in the whiche it comprehendith
	thilke same symple forme that ne may
	nevere ben knowen to noon of that othere (that
	is to seyn, to none of tho thre forseyde strengthis
	of the soule). For it knoweth the universite of
185	resoun, and the figure of ymaginacioun, and the
	sensible material conceyved by wit; ne it ne
	useth nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne
	of wit withoute-forth; but it byholdeth alle
	thingis, so as I schal seie, by o strook of
190	thought formely (withoute discours or
	collacioun). Certes resoun, whan it lokith
	any thing universel, it ne useth nat of
	ymaginacioun, nor of wit; and algatis yit it
	comprehendith the thingis ymaginable and
195	sensible. For reson is she that diffynyscheth the
	universel of here conceyte ryght thus: man is a
	resonable two-foted beest. And how so that this
	knowynge is universel, yit nis ther no wyght that
	ne wot wel that a man is a thing ymaginable
200	and sensible; and this same considereth wel
	resoun; but that nis nat by ymaginacioun
	nor by wit, but it lookith it by resonable
	concepcioun. Also ymaginacioun, albeit so that
	it takith of wit the bygynnynges to seen and to
205	formen the figures, algates althoughe that wit ne
	were nat present, yit it envyrowneth and
	comprehendith alle thingis sensible, nat by
	resoun sensible of demynge, but by resoun
	ymaginatyf. Seestow nat thanne that alle
210	the thingis in knowynge usen more of hir
	faculte or of hir power than thei don of the
	faculte or power of thingis that ben iknowe? Ne
	that nis nat wrong; for so as every jugement is
	the dede or the doyng of hym that demeth, it
215	byhoveth that every wyght performe the werk
	and his entencioun, nat of foreyne power, but of
	his propre power.
Metrum 4	"The porche (that is to seyn, a gate of the
	toun of Athenis there as philosophris hadden
	hir congregacioun to desputen) -- thilke porche
	broughte somtyme olde men, ful dirke in hir
5	sentences (that is to seyn, philosophris that
	hyghten Stoycienis), that wenden that ymages
	and sensibilities (that is to seyn, sensible ymaginaciouns
	or ellis ymaginaciouns of sensible
	thingis) weren enprientid into soules fro
10	bodyes withoute-forth (as who seith that
	thilke Stoycienis wenden that the sowle
	had ben nakid of itself, as a mirour or a clene
	parchemyn, so that alle figures most first
	comen fro thinges fro withoute into soules,
15	and ben emprientid into soules); (Textus)
	ryght as we ben wont somtyme by a swift
	poyntel to fycchen lettres emprientid in the
	smothnesse or in the pleynesse of the table of
	wex or in parchemyn that ne hath no figure
20	ne note in it. (Glose. But now argueth
	Boece ayens that opynioun and seith
	thus:) But yif the thryvynge soule ne unpliteth
	nothing (that is to seyn, ne doth nothing) by his
	propre moevynges, but suffrith and lith subgit
25	to the figures and to the notes of bodies
	withoute-forth, and yeldith ymages ydel and
	vein in the manere of a mirour, whennes
	thryveth thanne or whennes comith thilke
	knowynge in our soule, that discernith and
30	byholdith alle thinges? And whennes is
	thilke strengthe that byholdeth the singuler
	thinges? Or whennes is the strengthe that
	devydeth thinges iknowe; and thilke strengthe
	that gadreth togidre the thingis devyded; and
35	the strengthe that chesith his entrechaunged
	wey? For somtyme it hevyth up the heved (that
	is to seyn, that it hevyth up the entencioun) to
	ryght heye thinges, and somtyme it descendith
	into ryght lowe thinges; and whan
40	it retorneth into hymself it reproveth and
	destroyeth the false thingis by the trewe
	thinges. Certes this strengthe is cause more
	efficient, and mochel more myghty to seen and
	to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that suffrith
45	and resceyveth the notes and the figures
	empressid in manere of matere. Algatis the
	passion (that is to seyn, the suffraunce or the wit)
	in the quyke body goth byforn, excitynge and
	moevynge the strengthes of the thought,
50	ryght so as whan that cleernesse smyteth
	the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or
	ryght so as voys or soun hurteleth to the eres
	and commoeveth hem to herkne; than is the
	strengthe of the thought imoevid and excited,
55	and clepith forth to semblable moevyngis the
	speces that it halt withynne itself, and addith
	tho speces to the notes and to the thinges
	withoute-forth, and medleth the ymagis of
	thinges withoute-forth to the foormes ihidd
60	withynne hymself.
Prosa 5	"But what yif that in bodyes to ben feled
	(that is to seyn, in the takynge of knowlechynge
	of bodily thinges), and albeit so that the
	qualites of bodies that ben object fro withoute-forth
5	moeven and entalenten the instrumentz
	of the wittes, and albeit so that the passioun
	of the body (that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce)
	goth toforn the strengthe of the wirkynge
	corage, the whiche passioun or
10	sufraunce clepith forth the dede of the
	thought in hymself and moeveth and exciteth
	in this menewhile the formes that resten
	within-forth, and yif that in sensible bodies,
	as I have seid, our corage nis nat ytaught or
15	empriented by passioun to knowe thise thinges,
	but demeth and knoweth of his owne strengthe
	the passioun or suffrance subject to the body --
	moche more than tho thingis that ben absolut
	and quit fro alle talentz or affecciouns of
20	bodyes (as God or his aungelis) ne folwen
	nat in discernynge thinges object fro withoute-forth,
	but thei acomplissen and speden
	the dede of hir thought. By this resoun,
	thanne, ther comen many maner knowynges to
25	dyverse and differynge substaunces. For the
	wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and
	despoiled of alle oothre knowynges -- thilke
	wit cometh to beestis that ne mowen nat
	moeven hemself her and ther, as oistres
30	and muscles and oothir swich schellefyssche
	of the see that clyven and ben norisschid
	to roches. But the ymaginacioun cometh
	to remuable bestis, that semen to han talent to
	fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al
35	oonly to the lynage of mankynde, ryght as
	intelligence is oonly the devyne nature. Of
	whiche it folweth that thilke knowynge is more
	worth than thise oothre, syn it knoweth by his
	propre nature nat oonly his subget (as who
40	seith, it ne knoweth nat al oonly that apertenith
	properly to his knowinge) but it knoweth
	the subjectz of alle othre knowynges.
	"But how schal it thanne be, yif that wit and
	ymaginacioun stryven ayein resonynge and seyn
45	that, of thilke universel thingis that resoun
	weneth to seen, that it nis ryght naught? For wit
	and ymaginacioun seyn that that that is sensible
	or ymaginable, it ne mai nat ben universel;
	thanne is either the jugement of resoun
50	soth, ne that ther nis no thing sensible; or
	elles, for that resoun woot wel that many
	thinges ben subject to wit and to ymaginacioun,
	thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and
	fals, whiche that lokith and comprehendith that
55	that is sensible and singuler as universel. And yif
	that resoun wolde answere ayein to thise two
	(that is to seyn, to wit and to ymaginacioun),
	and seyn that sothly sche hirselve (that is to
	seyn, resoun) lokith and comprehendith,
60	by resoun of universalite, bothe that that is
	sensible and that that is ymaginable;
	and that thilke two (that is to seyn, wit and
	ymaginacioun) ne mowen nat strecchen ne
	enhaunsen hemself to knowynge of universalite,
65	for that the knowynge of hem ne mai exceden ne
	surmounten the bodily figures: certes of the
	knowynge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven
	credence to the more stidfast and to the mor
	parfit jugement; in this manere stryvynge,
70	thanne, we that han strengthe of resonynge
	and of ymagynynge and of wit (that is to
	seyn, by resoun and by imagynacioun and by
	wit), we scholde rathir preise the cause of resoun
	(as who seith, than the cause of wit and of
75	ymaginacioun).
	"Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of
	mankynde ne weneth nat that the devyne
	intelligence byholdeth or knoweth thingis to
	comen, but ryght as the resoun of
80	mankynde knoweth hem. For thou arguist
	and seist thus: that if it ne seme nat to men
	that some thingis han certeyn and necessarie
	bytydynges, thei ne mowen nat ben wist byforn
	certeinly to betyden, and thanne nis ther no
85	prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe
	that prescience be in thise thingis, thanne is ther
	nothing that it ne bytydeth by necessite. But
	certes yif we myghten han the jugement of
	the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoners of
90	resoun, ryght so as we han demyd that it
	byhovith that ymaginacioun and wit ben
	bynethe resoun, ryght so wolde we demen that
	it were ryghtfull thing that mannys resoun
	oughte to summytten itself and to ben bynethe
95	the devyne thought. For whiche yif that we
	mowen (as who seith that, if that we mowen,
	I conseile that) we enhaunse us into the heighte
	of thilke soverein intelligence; for ther schal
	resoun wel seen that that it ne mai nat
100	byholden in itself, and certes that is this:
	in what manere the prescience of God
	seeth alle thinges certeins and diffinyssched,
	althoughe thei ne han no certein issues or
	bytydyngis; ne this nis noon opinioun, but it is
105	rather the simplicite of the soverein science,
	that nis nat enclosed nor ischet withinne none
	boundes.
Metrum 5	"The beestes passen by the erthes be ful
	diverse figures. For some of hem han hir bodyes
	straught, and crepyn in the dust, and drawen
	aftir hem a traas or a furwe icontynued (that
5	is to sein, as naddres or snakes); and oothre
	beestis by the wandrynge lyghtnesse of hir
	wynges beten the wyndes, and overswymmen
	the spaces of the longe eir by moyst fleynge;
	and oothere beestes gladen hemself to diggen
10	hir traas or hir steppys in the erthe
	with hir goinges or with hir feet, and to
	gon either by the grene feeldes or elles to
	walken undir the wodes. And al be it so that
	thou seest that thei alle discorden by diverse
15	foormes, algatis hir faces enclyned hevyeth hir
	dulle wittes. Only the lynage of man heveth
	heyest his heie heved, and stondith light with
	his upryght body, and byholdeth the erthes
	undir hym. And, but yif thou, erthly man,
20	waxest yvel out of thi wit, this figure
	amonesteth the, that axest the hevene with
	thi ryghte visage and hast areised thi forheved,
	to beren up an hye thi corage, so that thi thought
	ne be nat ihevyed ne put lowe undir fote, syn
25	that thi body is so heyghe areysed.
Prosa 6	"Therfore thanne, as I have schewed a litel
	herebyforne that alle thing that is iwist nis nat
	knowen by his nature propre, but by the nature
	of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke
5	now, in as mochil as it is leveful to us (as who
	seith, lat us loke now as we mowen) whiche that
	the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that
	we mowe eek knowen what his science is. The
	comune jugement of alle creatures resonables
10	thanne is this: that God is eterne.
	Lat us considere thanne what is eternite;
	for certes that schal schewen us togidre the
	devyne nature and the devyne science. Eternite,
	thanne, is parfit possessioun and al togidre
15	of lif interminable; and that scheweth. more
	cleerly by the comparysoun or collacioun of
	temporel thinges. For alle thing that lyveth in
	tyme, it is present and procedith fro preteritz
	into futures (that is to seyn, fro tyme passed
20	into tyme comynge), ne ther nis nothing
	establisshed in tyme that mai enbrasen togidre
	al the space of his lif. For certis yit ne
	hath it nat taken the tyme of tomorwe, and it
	hath lost that of yusterday, and certes in the
25	lif of this dai ye ne lyve namore but right
	as in this moevable and transitorie moment.
	Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel condicioun,
	althoughe that it nevere bygan to
	be, ne thoughe it nevere ne cese for to be,
30	as Aristotile deemed of the world, and
	althoughe that the lif of it be strecchid with
	infinite of tyme; yit algatis nis it no swich thing
	that men mighten trowen by ryght that it is
	eterne. For althouhe that it comprehende and
35	embrase the space of lif infinit, yit algatis ne
	enbraseth it nat the space of the lif al togidre; for
	it ne hath nat the futuris (that ne ben nat yit),
	ne it ne hath no lengere the preteritz (that
	ben idoon or ipassed). But thilke thing,
40	thanne, that hath and comprehendith
	togidre al the plente of the lif interminable,
	to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future, and
	to whom ther nis noght of the preteryt escaped
	nor ipassed, thilke same is iwitnessed and
45	iproevid by right to ben eterne; and it byhovith
	by necessite that thilke thing be alwey present to
	hymself and compotent (as who seith, alwey
	present to hymselve and so myghty that al be
	right at his plesaunce), and that he have al
50	present the infinit of the moevable tyme.
	"Wherfore som men trowen wrongfully
	that, whan thei heren that it semede to Plato that
	this world ne hadde nevere bygynnynge of
	tyme, ne that it nevere schal han failynge, thei
55	wenen in this manere that this world be makid
	coeterne with his makere. (As who seith, thei
	wene that this world and God ben makid
	togidre eterne, and that is a wrongful wenynge.)
	For other thing is it to ben ilad
60	by lif interminable, as Plato grauntide to
	the world, and oothir is it to enbrace
	togidre al the presence of the lif intermynable,
	the whiche thing it is cleer and manyfest that it
	is propre to the devyne thought. Ne it ne
65	scholde nat semen to us that God is eldere than
	thinges that ben imaked by quantite of tyme, but
	rathir by the proprete of his simple nature. For
	this ilke infinit moevyng of temporel thinges
	folweth this presentarie estat of the lif
70	inmoevable; and, so as it ne mai nat
	contrefetin it ne feynen it, ne be evene lik
	to it, [fro] the immoevablete (that is to sein, that
	is in the eternite of God) it faileth and fallith into
	moevynge, [and] fro the simplicite of the
75	presence of [God] disencresith into the infinit
	quantite of future and of preterit; and so as it ne
	mai nat han togidre al the plente of the lif,
	algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth nevere for
	to ben in som manere, it semyth somdel to
80	us that it folwith and resembleth thilke
	thing that it ne mai nat atayne to ne
	fulfillen, and byndeth itself to som maner
	presence of this litle and swift moment, the
	whiche presence of this litle and swifte moment,
85	for that it bereth a maner ymage or liknesse of
	the ai duellynge presence of God, it grauntith to
	swich manere thinges as it betydith to that it
	semeth hem that thise thinges han iben and ben.
	And for that the presence of swiche litil
90	moment ne mai nat duelle, therfore it
	ravysschide and took the infynit wey of
	tyme (that is to seyn, by successioun). And by
	this manere is it idoon for that it sholde contynue
	the lif in goinge, of the whiche lif it ne myght nat
95	enbrace the plente in duellinge. And forthi yif
	we wollen putten worthi names to thinges and
	folwen Plato, lat us seyen thanne sothly that God
	is `eterne,' and that the world is `perpetuel.'
	"Thanne, syn that every jugement knoweth
100	and comprehendith by his owne nature
	thinges that ben subgect unto hym,
	ther is sothly to God alweys an eterne
	and presentarie estat; and the science of hym, that
	overpasseth alle temporel moevement, duelleth
105	in the simplicite of his presence, and embraceth
	and considereth alle the infynit spaces of tymes
	preteritz and futures, and lokith in his simple
	knowynge alle thinges of preterit ryght as thei
	weren idoon presently ryght now. Yif
110	thou wolt thanne thinken and avise the
	prescience by whiche it knoweth alle
	thinges, thou ne schalt naught demen it as
	prescience of thinges to comen, but thou schalt
	demen more ryghtfully that it is science of
115	presence or of instaunce that nevere ne faileth.
	For whiche it nis nat ycleped `previdence,' but it
	sholde rathir ben clepid `purveaunce,' that is
	establisshed ful fer fro ryght lowe thinges, and
	byholdeth fro afer alle thingis, right as it
120	were fro the heye heighte of thinges.
	"Why axestow thanne, or whi desputestow
	thanne, that thilke thingis ben doon
	by necessite whiche that ben yseyn and knowen
	by the devyne sighte, syn that forsothe men ne
125	maken nat thilke thinges necessarie whiche that
	thei seen ben idoon in hir sighte? For addith thi
	byholdynge any necessite to thilke thinges that
	thou byholdest present?"
	"Nay," quod I.
130	Philosophie. "Certes, thanne, yif men
	myghte maken any digne comparysoun or
	collacioun of the presence devyne and of the
	presence of mankynde, ryght so as ye seen some
	thinges in this temporel present, ryght so seeth
135	God alle thinges by his eterne present.
	"Wherfore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth
	nat the nature ne the proprete of thinges,
	but byholdeth swiche thingis present to hym-ward
	as thei shollen betyde to yow-ward
140	in tyme to comen. Ne it ne confowndeth
	nat the jugementz of thingis; but by o
	sight of his thought he knoweth the thinges
	to comen, as wel necessarie as nat necessarie.
	Ryght so as whan ye seen togidre a man walke
145	on the erthe and the sonne arisen in the
	hevene, albeit so that ye seen and byholden the
	ton and the tothir togidre, yit natheles ye demen
	and discerne that the toon is voluntarie
	and the tothir is necessarie. Ryght so
150	thanne the devyne lookynge, byholdynge
	alle thinges undir hym, ne trowbleth nat
	the qualite of thinges that ben certeinly present
	to hym-ward but, as to the condicioun of tyme,
	forsothe thei ben futur. For which it folwith that
155	this nis noon opynioun, but rathir a stidfast
	knowynge istrengthid by soothnesse that, whan
	that God knoweth any thing to be, he ne unwot
	not that thilke thing wantith necessite to be.
	(This is to sein that whan that God knoweth
160	any thing to betide, he wot wel that it ne
	hath no necessite to betyde.)
	"And yif thou seist here that thilke thing that
	God seeth to betide, it ne may nat unbytide (as
	who seith, it moot bytide), and thilke thing that
165	ne mai nat unbytide, it mot bytiden by necessite,
	and that thou streyne me to this name of
	necessite, certes I wol wel confessen and
	byknowen a thing of ful sad trouthe. But
	unnethe schal ther any wight mowe seen it
170	or come therto, but yif that he be
	byholdere of the devyne thought. For I wol
	answeren the thus: that thilke thing that is futur,
	whan it is referred to the devyne knowynge,
	than is it necessarie; but certis whan it is
175	undirstonden in his owene kynde, men seen it
	outrely fre and absolut fro alle necessite.
	"For certes ther ben two maneris of
	necessites: that oon necessite is symple, as thus:
	that it byhovith by necessite that alle men
180	ben mortal or dedly; anothir necessite is
	condicionel, as thus: yif thow wost that a
	man walketh, it byhovith by necessite that he
	walke. Thilke thing, thanne, that any wight hath
	iknowe to be, it ne mai ben noon oothir weys
185	thanne he knowith it to be. But this condicion ne
	draweth nat with hir thilke necessite simple; for
	certes this necessite condicionel -- the propre
	nature of it ne makith it nat, but the adjeccioun
	of the condicioun makith it. For no necessite
190	ne constreyneth a man to gon that
	goth by his propre wil, al be it so that whan
	he goth that it is necessarie that he goth. Ryght
	on this same manere thanne, yf that the
	purveaunce of God seeth any thyng present,
195	than moot thilke thing ben by necessite,
	althoghe that it ne have no necessite of his owne
	nature. But certes the futures that bytiden by
	fredom of arbitrie, God seth hem alle togidre
	presentz. Thise thinges thanne, yif thei ben
200	referrid to the devyne sighte, than ben they
	maked necessarie by the condicioun of the
	devyne knowynge. But certes yif thilke thingis
	ben considered by hemself, thei ben absolut of
	necessite, and ne forleten nat ne cesen nat of
205	the liberte of hir owne nature. Thanne certes
	withoute doute alle the thinges shollen ben
	doon whiche that God woot byforn that thei ben
	to comen. But some of hem comen and bytiden
	of fre arbitrie or of fre wil, that, al be it so
210	that thei bytiden, yit algates ne lese thei nat
	hir propre nature in beinge, by the whiche,
	first or that thei weren idon, thei hadden power
	noght to han bytyd."
	Boece. "What is this to seyn thanne," quod I,
215	"that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by hir propre
	nature, so as thei comen in alle maneris in the
	liknesse of necessite by the condicioun of the
	devyne science?"
	Philosophie. "This is the difference,"
220	quod sche, "that tho thinges that I purposide
	the a litil herbyforn -- that is to seyn,
	the sonne arysynge and the man walkynge --
	that ther-whiles that thilke thinges ben idoon,
	they ne myghte nat ben undoon; natheles that
225	oon of hem, or it was idoon, it byhovide by
	necessite that it was idoon, but nat that oothir.
	Ryght so is it here, that the thinges that God
	hath present, withoute doute thei shollen ben.
	But some of hem descendith of the nature
230	of thinges (as the sonne arysynge); and
	some descendith of the power of the doeris
	(as the man walkynge). Thanne seide I no wrong
	that, yif that thise thinges ben referred to the
	devyne knowynge, thanne ben thei necessarie;
235	and yif thei ben considered by hemself, than ben
	thei absolut fro the boond of necessite. Right so
	as alle thingis that apiereth or scheweth to the
	wittes, yif thou referre it to resoun, it is
	universel; and yif thou loke it or referre it
240	to itself, than is it singuler.
	"But now yif thou seist thus: that, `If it be
	in my power to chaunge my purpos, than schal
	I voiden the purveaunce of God, whan paraventure
	I schal han chaungid the thingis that
245	he knoweth byforn,' thanne schal I answeren
	the thus: `Certes thou maist wel chaungen thi
	purpos; but for as mochil as the present
	sothnesse of the devyne purveaunce byholdeth
	that thou maist chaunge thi purpos, and
250	whethir thou wolt chaunge it or no, and
	whider-ward that thou torne it, thou ne
	maist nat eschuen the devyne prescience, ryght
	as thou ne maist nat fleen the sighte of the
	present eye, althoghe that thou torne thiself by
255	thi fre wil into diverse acciouns.' But thou maist
	sein ayein: `How schal it thanne be -- schal nat
	the devyne science ben chaunged by my
	disposicioun whan that I wol o thing now and
	now anothir? And thilke prescience -- ne
260	semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundis of
	knowynge?'" (As who seith, ne schal it nat
	seme to us that the devyne prescience entrechaungith
	hise diverse stoundes of knowynge,
	so that it knowe somtyme o thing, and somtyme
265	the contrarie?)
	"No, forsothe," quod she, "for the devyne
	sighte renneth toforn and seeth alle futures, and
	clepith hem ayen and retorneth hem to the
	presence of his propre knowynge; ne he ne
270	entrechaungith nat, so as thou wenest, the
	stoundes of foreknowynge, as now this,
	now that; but he ay duellynge cometh byforn,
	and enbraseth at o strook alle thi mutaciouns.
	And this presence to comprehenden and to seen
275	alle thingis -- God ne hath nat taken it of the
	bytidynge of thinges to come, but of his propre
	symplicite. And herby is assoiled thilke thing
	that thou puttest a litel herebyforn; that is to
	seyn, that it is unworthy thing to seyn that
280	our futures yeven cause of the science of
	God. For certis this strengthe of the devyne
	science, whiche that embraseth alle thinges by
	his presentarie knowynge, establissheth manere
	to alle thinges, and it ne oweth nawht to lattere
285	thinges.
	"And syn that thise thinges ben thus (that is
	to seyn, syn that necessite nis nat in thinges by
	the devyne prescience), thanne is ther fredom of
	arbitrie, that duelleth hool and unwemmed
290	to mortal men; ne the lawes ne purposen
	nat wikkidly medes and peynes to the
	willynges of men that ben unbownden and quyt
	of alle necessite; and God, byholdere and
	forwytere of alle thingis, duelleth above, and the
295	present eternite of his sighte renneth alwey with
	the diverse qualite of our dedes, dispensynge
	and ordeynynge medes to gode men and
	tormentz to wikkide men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn
	ne ben ther put in God hope and preyeris
300	that ne mowen nat ben unspedful ne
	withouten effect whan they been ryghtful.
	"Withstond thanne and eschue thou vices;
	worschipe and love thou vertues; areise thi
	corage to ryghtful hopes; yilde thou humble
305	preieres an heyhe. Gret necessite of prowesse
	and vertu is encharged and comaunded to yow,
	yif ye nil nat dissimulen; syn that ye worken and
	don (that is to seyn, your dedes or your werkes)
	byforn the eyen of the juge that seeth and
310	demeth alle thinges."

Explicit liber Boecii.

Site Updated March 31, 2011